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1. Introduction 
“I’m struck by what seems to be a huge disconnect between the systems being modeled by 
academic economists and the proposals emerging from field tests and demonstrations 
involving actual motorists.” (Poole 2012) 
 
Road pricing reform is much touted by economists and others who see the current charging 
instruments inadequate in both delivering efficient outcomes for road use (especially in controlling 
levels of traffic congestion) as well as raising sufficient revenue to fund new infrastructure as well as 
much needed maintenance of existing road networks (see Verhoef et al. 2008 and Manville and King 
2012). It is estimated that traffic congestion in Australia resulted in AU$9.4 billion of avoidable social 
costs in 2005, increasing to AU$20.4 billion by 2020 (BTRE 2007). In the USA, the congestion costs 
(in constant 2009 dollars) continue to rise from US$24 billion in 1982 to $115 billion in 2009; this is 
associated with 3.9 billion gallons of wasted fuel (equivalent to 130 days of flow in the Alaska 
pipeline), and a $US808 cost impost per average commuter in 2009 (Texas Transportation Institute 
2011). This results in a predictable 'tragedy of the commons'.  
Despite these well known statistics, politicians in the main are not supportive of road pricing reform. 
An example that is typical of political responses is:  
 
“We will not introduce a congestion tax for motorists … due to the lacklustre standard of 
the state’s public transport system. …The Minister … has ruled out imposing a tax on 
motorists entering the CBD similar to a system used in London. There cannot be a 
congestion toll if there is no public transport, and the one thing that [we] … have not got is 
proper public transport,” he says. “It would be so unfair to put a congestion tax on people 
that have no alternative to using their car.”1
 
 
The greatest challenge is how to gain public acceptance2
                                                          
1 It is often the case that when politicians refer to public transport they are assuming rail-based solutions, which are not only very 
expensive, but in the context of road pricing take many years to deliver, making the case for road pricing reform simultaneously 
accompanied by public transport vexed. If, however, like London, we consider improving public transport by introducing a large increase in 
the number of buses (designed not to create more havoc on the roads in mixed traffic but to support switching away from the car), then 
road pricing reform can simultaneously be achieved in terms of a timeline with improvement in public transport. A large increase in buses 
to support greater connectivity and frequency (something not so feasible with single corridor rail projects) can readily be facilitated given 
the availability of buses of high quality manufactured in countries such as China. 
 that is also convincing to politicians. We are 
of the belief that road pricing reform will entail a slow but progressive set of steps that must comply 
with the adage “keep it simple and singularly focussed” but do not start with the ultimate journey end 
pricing solution to reduce traffic congestion, but with some initiative that has an easier staged sell. 
Crucially the focus of the reform process must be on asking ‘are travellers paying for the right things’ 
and not ‘are they already paying enough’? This also translates into a request to stop being obsessed 
with the question of how much car users pay on average, for congestion is not caused by “…the fact 
2 The experience below typifies public sentiment, albeit misinformed. Setting: ABC Radio 702 Tuesday 4 Oct 2011 8.30-8.55am. Hensher 
discusses the merits of Road Pricing Reform (after stating clearly that it is more than a congestion tax, and to please stop using the 
emotive language of a congestion TAX). Conversation proceeds and calls are invited. A plumber calls in. He says (paraphrase): “…I 
spend up to 5 hours on the roads every day between jobs and now you are telling me I have to pay a congestion tax on top of all of my 
existing costs for the 5 hours. What is he thinking (the Professor needs to get real)… I do not earn enough income now as it is.” Hensher’s 
response (paraphrased): “…I made it very clear I thought that the aim is to reform the entire set of charges (including registration fees) 
and to set the kilometre based charges to reflect the traffic conditions with the aim of not only enabling you to save time (which is money 
as well) but to give you realistic options on levels of charge and time of day to travel. It is expected that you will spend less time travelling 
and can convert such saved time into more productive income earning time.” This is the buy in challenge – how to convince voters that 
there are benefits to them. 
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that the tax on a car trip is 50p on average: it is caused by the fact that the next trip is always 
[perceived as] free.” (Harford 2006). 
2. Policy objectives that require addressing  
Introducing road pricing is a delicate task as there are many and diverse interests at stake. In general, 
travellers would like to have a fair system and typically do not like paying more than they currently 
do. Public acceptability is often regarded as a prerequisite for introducing road pricing. If the public 
acceptability is not there, politicians typically find the topic too controversial. On the other hand, 
governments face the issue of raising sufficient revenues for building new roads and maintaining 
existing roads, while at the same time they are held responsible for solving any congestion problems. 
What is often not realised by the public is that building new infrastructure is extremely expensive and 
will generally not ‘solve’ congestion problems. Congestion typically appears during the morning and 
evening peaks, typically about five to seven hours a day3
The main question is: is it possible to find a road pricing strategy that (i) is acceptable and well-
understood by the community, (ii) raises sufficient revenues for infrastructure investment and 
maintenance, (iii) is revenue neutral or better to satisfy Treasury, (iv) would alleviate congestion, (v) 
would be technically simple (meaning less risk) and inexpensive, and (vi) addresses adequately the 
vertical equity concerns? 
. At other times there is an oversupply of 
infrastructure and the roads are under-utilised. Many, but by no means not all, people may have 
already adapted their departure times to avoid some or most of the delays in travel time by leaving 
earlier or later to work. Building extra roads would mean that some travellers would shift back to their 
preferred departure time, and that others will change mode to car use, so because of this, congestion 
would again appear and may even end being worse than prior to the road improvement. Hence, in the 
best of cases it may provide comfort to car drivers not to get up so early, but would not decrease their 
travel time much and it would come at a large expense in infrastructure investment.  
If all six points could be ticked, it would be a big sell for road pricing. However, this is not trivial, as 
some of the objectives are not in line with each other (Joksimovic et al. 2006). For example, for 
raising revenues, the optimal strategy would be to price everyone and not offer any alternatives. A 
fixed annual fee is an example of this strategy, where the only alternative to not paying is to sell the 
car. In contrast, for the objective of alleviating congestion, the optimal strategy is to offer many 
alternatives (i.e., offer plenty of relevant choices) such that there may be fewer car trips, and the 
remaining trips would be distributed better over time and space. A space and time dependent 
kilometre charge is an example of this strategy, where the road pricing fee can be avoided by not 
driving, driving at a different time period, driving on another route, or switching to another mode. A 
fixed annual fee is a much simpler strategy to implement, while a space and time dependent kilometre 
charging strategy likely relies on installing GPS devices in vehicles. Privacy issues are often 
mentioned when using GPS devices, but these issues can be and have been largely resolved4
We could argue that offering travellers alternatives that would avoid paying any tolls, taxes, or prices 
would be of interest to the traveller, and therefore could provide a means to increase acceptance. We 
argue that offering such choices is relevant in pricing strategies, and we come back to this point later. 
Furthermore, total revenues could be kept the same (revenue neutral for Treasury), but rather have 
frequent car drivers who travel many kilometres each year, especially in the peak periods, pay more 
than less frequent drivers, which would be fair.  
. 
                                                          
3 There is a view amongst specialists in traffic management that it only takes about a six percent reduction in the number of trips in the 
peak period to reduce the worst of the congestion. 
4 Instead of letting the GPS device send the complete GPS trail of locations of an individual car driver, the information can be transformed 
or aggregated in such a way that, for example, only the charge to be paid is sent, or only the distance travelled in certain areas or certain 
road types at certain time intervals, etc. As a result, the exact locations of each driver cannot be traced. 
What type of road pricing scheme might appeal to politicians?  Gaining the citizen vote by staging 
reform  
Hensher and Bliemer 
 
3 
The next sections describe how road pricing could be sold and how a transition could take place from 
the current status quo.  
3. A starting position: What do voters think about reform 
options? 
In recent research by Hensher et al. (2012), a model of choice between the current situation and a 
number of reform packages, suggested, ex ante, that over 62 per cent of participants would vote for a 
cordon-based payment of $8 to enter the crowded Sydney CBD in peak periods and $3 outside of 
peak periods, respondents would also be prepared to pay the charge on top of existing annual 
registration fees (ARFs) and fuel costs so long as 100 percent of the revenue was used to improve 
public transport. This reduces to 60.9 per cent when the revenue is allocated 50:50 to public transport 
and road improvements. Distance-based charging is clearly less popular if there is no reduction of the 
ARF and no hypothecation of revenue to uses supported by voters, with the highest percentage voting 
for a scheme, where the charge is 3c/km in the peak only, being 32.2 per cent. A particularly 
important finding is that when the revenue allocation is recognised in conjunction with distance-based 
charging, the support increases from 17.6 percent (under 5c/km) to between 25.5 and 27.12 percent 
(depending on the revenue allocation plan). If however, we eliminated the annual registration fee in 
the presence of a peak charge of 3c/km, and hypothecated all the revenue to public transport 
improvements, over 51 percent would vote for the scheme, enough to ensure a positive outcome. The 
evidence reinforces the view in the growing literature, in the absence of a trial that delivers real time 
savings, that how the revenue is allocated is critical to obtaining buy in to road pricing proposals (see 
Hensher and Li 2012)5
A cordon-based charging scheme in a specific location such as the CBD may be a good starting 
scheme as long as it can demonstrate real time benefits
. 
6
4. Language support: Switch from no-choice pricing to choice 
pricing 
; however this is something that is by no 
means clear in many cities (and hence a real risk of failure).  Such an initiative should be seen as a 
pilot scheme, as in Stockholm, that is then subject to a referendum so that it is carried forward with 
community support in contrast to a government imposed scheme. It is not however a ‘solution’ to 
improving the efficiency of the entire network in a metropolitan area, recognising that much of the 
traffic congestion is often on roads far away from a CBD. The challenge then is to find a way of 
beginning the pricing reform journey that can deliver widespread benefits to the entire transport 
network. The remaining sections of the paper focus on this agenda, but we start with a plea for a new 
language to assist the debate on road pricing reform. 
ARFs and fuel excise are unrelated to specific kilometres travelled and specific travel time outlaid in 
terms of a charging mechanism that can be used to discriminate between travel at specific locations 
and times of day. To emphasise the need for alternatives, and to give users more choices in a use-
related pricing reform scheme, a critical (albeit intuitively useful) distinction in the selling of road 
pricing reform in language that can be understood by the population of travellers affected by pricing 
reform, is what we call no choice pricing vs. choice pricing. This distinction offers a powerful 
marketing language designed to suggest some flexibility in the amount you pay to travel.   
                                                          
5 If a pilot program was introduced that showed real time benefits, as in Stockholm, then the requirement to ensure revenue hypothecation 
might be less relevant. 
6 There will be some spill-over benefits from a CBD treatment, but they unlikely to be sufficient to make a big difference to the 
performance of the network as a whole. 
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No choice pricing (NCP) is what we have currently with ARFs (for a given class of vehicle) and fuel 
excise charges. For a given class of vehicle, there is a fixed non-negotiable annual fee which is not 
linked to use of the road network; and fuel excise is a sum per litre of fuel that is essentially 
independent7
In contrast, choice pricing (CP) offers individuals a very visible choice to pay to use a particular road 
at a particular location and time of day, with different prices charged according to location and time of 
day, so that individuals have a real choice of paying or avoiding to pay a specific sum for specific 
kilometres. We believe that the population of voters would prefer a suite of CP instruments than the 
NCP instruments, especially if the choice pricing instruments can offer the opportunity to both save 
travel time and reduce the overall cost of motoring while exercising the right to avoid such a charge 
by switching out of the peak (by undertaking off peak car travel) or use public transport. We believe 
this is possible.  
 of the specific kilometres of travel. The idea of specific kilometres (and its link to 
locations and times of the day) is critical to the distinction between NCP and choice pricing, and is 
focussed on relating travel to sources and magnitudes of externalities such as traffic congestion and 
emissions. NCP instruments are essentially invisible charges at the time of specific trip activity, and 
are unrelated to the prices of alternatives. 
We would encourage the marketing of road pricing reform to stop using language like a congestion 
tax imposed on top of existing charges, and to start referring to no choice and choice pricing with 
reference to specific kilometres, or travel at specific times of the day and locations, and to talk about 
travel time benefits or annual registration fee discounts instead of reference to the emotional and 
misunderstood language associated with a congestion charge. 
5. Beginning the sell: Registration-usage reform  
5.1 Focus on cost reductions 
Let us begin with what is in place at present and see how that might be modified in line with a longer 
term objective. While we may wish, in time, to have a true distance-based or travel time related 
charging regime in which the charge varies by time of day and road type, it may be sensible for 
community buy in to see if we can modify the current mix of registration and fuel excise charges to 
signal real opportunities for individuals to reduce their road use cost outlays, even if the resulting 
level of traffic congestion does not deliver improvements in travel time (although such gains would be 
a real bonus). This focuses on what is seen by many, informed or otherwise, as the first blockage in 
gaining public acceptance. It is astounding how few individuals, when exposed to the idea of a 
congestion charge, relate it to time savings; the overwhelming response is: ‘why are we being slugged 
again given how bad the traffic is?” (see footnote 2). This disconnect is frightening, but may be the 
fault of those promoting the debate on road pricing reform via a reference to reducing congestion. It is 
not long after that the media pronounces that a congestion ‘tax’ is being proposed. 
The reform must emphasise a package of pricing reforms, which include current fees. Let us consider 
ARFs. These are typically imposed and collected by State governments (at least in the USA and 
Australia, for example) and vary in most cases by the class of vehicle, and certainly not by the amount 
of usage. It is assumed that usage is covered by fuel excise, which has been argued to be an 
inappropriate way of charging for usage in specific traffic settings. But what if we could redefine a 
transitional role for the ARF? In particular, why not introduce a baseline (or flag fall) fixed fee (which 
is significantly less than the current ARF) defined to support a minimum amount of annual usage, 
regardless of whether peak or off peak kilometres, this minimum based on a percentage (say 75 
percent) of an estimate of the previous two years of kilometres driven, much like what the taxation 
office does in a number of countries (e.g., Australia) with a “pay as you go” (PAYG) quarterly or 
annual up front estimate of tax obligations. The sum tailored to the recent historical evidence of each 
                                                          
7 Although we acknowledge that there is a link between variations in fuel consumed per kilometre and specific kilometres. 
What type of road pricing scheme might appeal to politicians?  Gaining the citizen vote by staging 
reform  
Hensher and Bliemer 
 
5 
vehicle can be promoted as a use-related ARF designed to have individuals ‘paying for what you do 
and not what you own’.  
This could be also calculated in accordance with the overall amount of revenue currently raised from 
this source (in the previous two years) to ensure that government (Treasury in particular) is no worse 
off. This is a very simple way of beginning the usage journey to achieving “those who benefit also 
pay”, even if we are not yet ready to have different charges by time of day and location. An 
adjustment would be made at the end of the year at an annual vehicle inspection (or other check point) 
as a refund or additional charge, depending on usage relative to the agreed baseline as proposed 
above8. People like refunds, so if the levels can encourage this, then it is a psychological win9. This 
then defines the baseline charge for the next period. The level could also be calculated so that there 
could be a reduction in fuel excise (or any cost component that can reasonably be adjusted10
If this stage one initiative ensures that Treasury is no worse off (and it can be adjusted to ensure this), 
and the public is happy with this reform, since it offers an incentive to reduce costs, then this is real 
progress. What we would have achieved is the beginning of a commitment to the notion of ‘user pays’ 
but without any additional financial impost on users or government. The real test of acceptance must 
come from a population-level poll on whether people think this is fair.  
) which 
will send another positive message about reforms that can appeal to the public, although this 
requirement is not critical.  
The baseline fixed fee could be further reduced each year, while increasing the avoidable kilometre-
linked cost component. Keeping the average costs of car users the same, this will be revenue neutral 
to Treasury, but at the same time provide scope for more discounts to car users that choose to drive 
less than the average annual number of kilometres (over all car users). In general, even assuming that 
no one would change their driving behaviour, the majority of the car drivers will be better off and pay 
less, while a smaller proportion of the population will pay more. This results from the fact that a small 
number of car users is responsible for a significant proportion of the total number of travelled 
kilometres, while many car drivers use their car relatively little. From percentiles of total kilometres 
travelled obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS 2010b), for example, approximately 
62 per cent of the car drivers in the state of New South Wales (NSW) would receive discounts on their 
current ARFs. 
Another way to start offering car drivers the option to save on their costs is voluntary participation in 
an ARF discount plan, in which they will guaranteed to never pay more than their current annual fee. 
If they drive less than the average annual number of kilometres (in NSW about 14,250 kilometres per 
year, ABS 2010b), they receive a proportional discount on their ARF. Again, the majority of the car 
drivers would benefit by entering such a plan. In order to keep it revenue neutral to Treasury, car 
drivers who do not participate will have to pay a fixed ARF that is determined yearly by the average 
annual kilometres driven by non-participants. In particular car drivers who drive significantly less 
than average would choose to participate and save money. As more car drivers participate, the ARFs 
of non-participants will slowly increase reflecting their higher average usage of the infrastructure. 
Such a scheme could be easily communicated as the choice between (i) a fixed ARF that gradually 
increases over the years, and (ii) participating in an ARF discount plan in which you will never pay 
more than the fixed ARF. This interesting voluntary discounted ARF concept, which we call ‘saving 
per automatically registered kilometre’ (SPARK), would likely be acceptable by the public (as it is 
opt-in and the majority saves money), could remain revenue neutral to Treasury, and does not require 
                                                          
8 This reformed registration two-tier charge has a sunk cost component and an avoidable cost component, the latter referring to the 
kilometre-linked charge that could be avoided.  
9 It is well known that if you start with a somewhat undesirable proposition and then offer something that you really want that is indeed 
‘better’, then the chances of support increase. 
10 In Australia, there is a problem in reducing fuel excise since it is collected by the Federal government and not the States; however a 
road pricing use-related charge would most likely be collected by the State government. Possible fees that could be adjusted (apart from 
annual vehicle registration) that are State related are driver licences, stamp duty of vehicle registration and fuel franchise taxes and/or 
fees.   
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expensive technology besides periodically (e.g., annually) monitoring the already automatically 
registered kilometres as shown in any car.  
5.2 Targeting specific kilometres 
There may be other, possibly more attractive, registration-usage reform scenarios worth considering 
which start targeting the specific peak vs. off peak kilometres (see Hensher and Mulley 2012 for 
further details). For example, we might begin by assuming that all annual kilometres are peak 
kilometres. If the driver wants to have a subset of kilometres recognised as off peak (including peak 
shoulder) kilometres, they must purchase a small on-board unit (OBU) (approximately $Aud100 once 
off cost) that will record the kilometres by time of day. The off peak kilometres are not charged, but 
peak kilometres will be charged at either an agreed cents/km11
This regime can, and ideally should, be related to the ARF, with the idea that the latter is adjusted 
from the full amount to close to zero
 or a fixed peak surcharge for bands of 
annual peak kilometres (the choice of charging regime must be cognizant of which will offer the least 
resistance in the initial phase of reform). Note that if an OBU is not installed, all kilometres will be 
charged as peak kilometres, giving an incentive to install a meter, just like households have had with 
off peak electricity meters or with water meters when they were first introduced.  
12 depending on the amount of kilometres travelled per annum in 
the peak, and the number of kilometres that have switched out of the peak in the previous year13 
(regardless of whether the reduced peak kilometres are now converted to off-peak kilometres, public 
transport trips, or eliminated travel). Although we recognise the possibility of complaints of 
unfairness (and political concerns) from those who claim they cannot switch some amount of 
kilometres out of the peak, we counter this by the argument that maintained peak kilometres are a 
contribution to peak congestion and are not currently being fully paid for; and that a significant 
number of road users (enough to make a difference to peak traffic congestion) do actually have a 
choice of time of day to travel14
The challenge is to identify an appropriate adjustment quantum in the ARF. It should be calculated on 
the basis of the reduction in the amount of annual peak kilometres. Herein lies the (perceived) vertical 
equity debate
. Car drivers that cannot switch, however, are likely rewarded with 
lower travel times due to fewer travellers in the peak period. We propose to reward the amount of 
switching out of the peak through a noticeable discount on the ARF, calculated in such a way that the 
revenue raised for the Treasury is not disadvantaged. The charge per peak kilometre or new peak 
annual surcharge is one way of securing revenue neutrality (even in the absence of  politically 
problematic c/km peak usage charge), which we believe is likely to be necessary to incentivise some 
amount of temporal switching if the ARF is too price inelastic to have any significant effect. 
15
                                                          
11 There can be a graduated set of peak charges to reflect the degree of peakiness in the traffic throughout the declared peak hours. 
 about fairness, which can work against both high and low annual peak kilometres if 
not carefully defined. One way forward might be to adopt a simple discount rule which amounts to a 
flat reduction in the ARF linked to the acquisition of the OBU, even if a differential amount for 
further reductions is offered.  Given the problems with absolute and percentage reductions in peak 
kilometres as the entitlement for an ARF adjustment, we suggest an incentive based on free peak 
kilometres for 50 per cent of peak kilometres if an OBU is purchased and a charge per additional peak 
12 Zero registration would not work because registration is the process where documentation is checked and so there should always be a 
minimum fee e.g., $50 to both cover the administrative fee and to maintain the process where insurance and roadworthiness is checked. 
13 For newly acquired cars which have no previous year kilometre history we would have to assume the kilometres of the previous vehicle 
which should be recorded by the regulatory inspection organisation. Individuals who have just received a driver’s licence will be ineligible 
for ant registration exemptions for one year until they have a baseline annual kilometres. If a household tries to evade the system by 
selling their cars to another member of the household every year to avoid any history of use, we would have to impose an estimate 
associated with the average annual kilometres for a vehicle in a particular geographic jurisdiction. Such data is readily available in cities in 
Australia. 
14 We recommend a research study to establish the ability to time of day switch. 
15 If one believes equity balance is appropriate, in the sense of being equitable for people who have made a location decision which is 
difficult to reverse, and in that sense is politically sensitive. 
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kilometre or an annual peak surcharge linked to bands of additional peak kilometres for the balance of 
peak kilometres16
5.3 An illustrative example 
, which begins the move to a distance-based charge, together with a 50 percent 
reduction in the ARF.  
Hensher and Mulley (2012) are undertaking detailed assessment of the likely impact of registration-
usage reform using data at the postcode (or suburb) level for the Sydney Metropolitan Area. The 
evidence is not yet available; however we provide an example below of the types of information and 
responses that we need to measure to establish the financial implication on classes of users. In our 
example, we do not account for vertical equity impacts that are being identified by Hensher and 
Mulley (2012). 
Let us begin by assuming that total annual kilometres are 15,000, all initially assumed to be peak 
kilometres. A motorist purchases an OBU, which means that only peak kilometres are then subject to 
a new charge, which we will define as a surcharge based on kilometre bands (in contrast to a cost per 
kilometre). We have arbitrarily defined five charge bands: <2,500 km; 2,500-5,000 km; 5,000-7,500 
km; 7,500-10,000 km, and >10,000 km per annum. A charge of $100 applies for band 1, with $100 
increments as the band increases. 
If peak kilometres are switched to off peak kilometres, the proposal is to reduce the ARF, which we 
will assume is currently $500. The reduction in fee will be $100 per move to a lower adjacent band 
plus a 25 per cent reduction in the ARF. The surcharge for remaining peak kilometres will be 
imposed. 
We assume that the initial peak kilometres are 8,000 (Band 4) and that the motorist has managed to 
reduce peak kilometres by 1,500, moving the peak kilometres to Band 3. Their costs comprise the 
Peak km surcharge of $300, a $100 reduction in the annual kilometre charge (Band 4 to Band 3) plus 
a 25 per cent discount on the ARF (for moving to Band 3) = 0.25*$500 = $125. The ARF now drops 
from $500 to $375. This driver saves $225 in total. 
The focus is on cost adjustments, but there will also be time benefits for both peak and off peak 
kilometres ex post, due to the individual switching and adjustments associated with traffic levels. If 
there is no switching, then the ARF remains at $500 and the annual peak charge is $400. The net 
impact to the user is $900 ($500+$400) – $675 ($375+300) = $225 plus time savings. Treasury is 
currently receiving only $500 and no system time benefits but will ex post receive $675 (i.e., $375 
ARF + $300 peak surcharge). Hypothecation of the $175 might be a politically worthwhile strategy to 
signal recognition of how the community would like to see road pricing revenue spent. 
In summary, a user in the absence of the reform package, will outlay $500 ARF and Treasury will 
receive the full amount. After the reform package is implemented, the user incurs a net increase of 
$175 per annum, which is the full net gain to Treasury. Importantly, this financial outlay is 
accompanied by travel time savings, associated with 1,500 reduced kilometres in the peak. Although 
the actual time savings will be dependent on the aggregate response by all drivers, if we assume that 
the value of travel time savings is $16 per person hour, then $175 of cost outlay is equivalent, on 
average, to 10.93 hours of time outlaid. If the users can reduce their travel time by at least 10.93 hours 
as a result of the reduction in peak kilometres, then they will be better off, and the traffic system will 
also benefit by reduced congestion. Assuming 10 trips per week in the peak, spread over 48 weeks per 
annum, the average time that would have to be saved to be no worse off (in generalised cost terms) is 
1.4 minutes per trip.  Given that the percentage reduction in peak kilometres for this user is 18.75 per 
cent (i.e., 1500/8000), one might reasonably expect a time savings better than 1.4 minutes on average. 
The final outcome will be dependent on how the reform package is responded to by the population of 
motorists; however our knowledge of elasticities suggests that the gains are likely to exist.  
                                                          
16 In this regime you could ignore new cars and new ownership by saying that x,000 km (worked on the average of the previous year 
national or local  statistics of usage) is the allocation of peak kilometres.  This is the most appealing pricing regime if it can be linked to 
reducing peak kilometres. 
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6. Continuing the sell: A time reduction benefit charge 
So far we have stayed away for the sensitive (emotional) and badly appreciated idea of explicitly 
paying to reduce congestion and gain travel time benefits, although some element of this clearly exists 
in the proposition outlined above. The next step, possibly after a two to three year implementation of 
proven registration-usage reform, with or without some element of fuel excise adjustment, is to think 
through ways of linking the charging reform to ways of saving people (passenger and freight vehicle) 
time, much like tolling of specific roads is designed to achieve, while still retaining the principles in 
place for a use-related registration fee. The next stage will be heavily influenced by the extent to 
which peak travel times are reduced as a result of the use-related registration fee reform. 
Let us assume that the main objective of stage 2 is to improve travel times in the peaks, which may be 
a better way of describing the task than reducing traffic congestion, given that the latter is only 
worthwhile if travel time is reduced. Government might consider a pilot test in a small geographical 
area (that has a few well delineated entry and exit locations) in which on-board computers linked to 
satellite-based GPS are used to monitor the travel times (and speeds) at various times of the day (and 
day of the week) on all roads in the selected jurisdiction. It may be feasible to use smart phones to 
capture relevant information. Ideally all vehicles should participate if they enter the area otherwise it 
could fail as a real evidence-based pilot.  
An alternative, less demanding pilot plan would be to relax the need that each vehicle entering the 
area participates, regardless of whether a cordon or distance-based charging regime is introduced. As 
long as the size of this volunteering population is large enough, there will be time benefits. In the 
Netherlands, rewarding schemes (see below) each had between 2,000 and 4,000 participants on 
concentrated roads (half of the projects using smartphones, and half with in-vehicle GPS). Provided 
that removing a few hundred cars from these roads has travel time impacts we do not require all 
vehicles to participate. The critical issue is to demonstrate real time benefits. The demonstration 
project in Stockholm showed that road pricing can have benefits regardless of how the revenue is 
spent, supporting a view that revenue allocation may not be necessary to gain support in the presence 
of a successful demonstration project. 
Drivers should be told that they will be charged for time reductions (or improvements) that guarantee 
elimination17
Do we have to charge for peak use when we might consider the alternative of rewarding off-peak 
travel that has moved out of the designated peak periods? 
 of delays due to traffic congestion. Initially we might not be in a position to strike an 
advance notice charge per km; but it is essential that motorists know that the charge is designed to 
ensure that they are not (unnecessarily) delayed in the traffic, and that at the end of each month 
drivers will be told how much they have to pay in return for delivering maximum travel times. If 
travel times exceed the government backed travel times, then the payment charge will be discounted 
by some formula based on each additional excess travel time minute. The first two months of the pilot 
should involve no charge (and maybe a small financial reward) in order for most users to get used to 
the plan. The charge should not be called a congestion charge (or tax) but a ‘time reduction benefit 
charge’ (TRBC). 
6.1 Rewarding vs charging 
Linked to the TRBC might be a financial reward that is netted off of the TRBC when motorists switch 
travel to pre-designated (entry) times of day that are mandated as times of day that contribute to 
reducing traffic in peak hours. We would not want to guarantee that there will be no congestion at 
these times of day, since that may not be true; but what is being done here is to take pressure off of the 
really serious peak times when delays are at their worst. Trips that are eligible to receive this trip time 
                                                          
17 We must be very careful with the language here. A very specific adjustment must be unambiguous, since free flow may 
not be guaranteed, but a significant improvement in travel time may be. 
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reduction benefit must have been undertaken previously in the defined periods in which the TRBC is 
applicable. Funds to support this time of day switch would need to be derived from the TRBC source.  
Such charging schemes (which are in effect rewards for ‘good community behaviour’) have been 
successfully implemented at several locations in the Netherlands with a pool of voluntary participants 
since 2008, in which 15 to 44 per cent of the car drivers opted for a different departure time (usually 
earlier), about one to six per cent chose to work from home, five to 14 per cent chose public transport, 
and depending on available route alternatives, up to 28 per cent chose a different route (see Bliemer et 
al. 2009). This confirms the argument that monetary incentives can have a huge impact on the travel 
choices, with more than half of the participating car drivers able to avoid paying any charges by 
changing their travel behaviour.  
6.1.1 A taxi tariff as a way of being aware of the charge in real time: It is time we want to save, 
not kilometres 
A simple pricing strategy that would not involve new technology, but would be related to a TRBC, is 
applying the taxi tariff methodology. Taxi meters around the world are often distance and time based. 
Distance based charging has been proposed in several countries, often so-called kilometre charging 
schemes; however, time based charging has been proposed less frequent. The rationale behind it is 
simple. During peak hours, the travel times are longer than the travel times during off-peak periods.  
Hence, paying per minute (like in a taxi) essentially means that one has to pay more during the peak 
periods than off-peak. Cars currently only register the total distance travelled, but could potentially 
also register the total time travelled without any significant technological adaptations. The charges 
could be based on these two numbers on an annual basis, and can be adjusted to reflect the impact on 
trip time reduction benefit and government revenue requirements.  
There may be some issues that need to be resolved, for instance what will happen when a major 
incident increases the travel time for car drivers, but the concept is interesting. 
7. Vertical equity considerations 
Regardless of the merits of each reform package in terms of the impact on levels of traffic congestion 
and hence time reduction benefits, there are very strong arguments opposing any reform if it 
discriminates between individuals on vertical equity grounds (i.e. the impact on individuals in 
different personal income groups). There is a large literature on the topic (e.g., Ison 1998, King et al., 
2007, Levinson 2010 and Peters and Kramer 2012). Despite the recognition that revenue allocation18
People who have a long commute to work will end up paying more. Therefore, the road pricing 
reform should not be an abrupt but rather be a gradual process (e.g., several years) in which people are 
given the opportunity to re-evaluate their mobility choices, including changing jobs and/or residential 
relocation. The road pricing reform should by no means force people to move or change jobs, but 
rather when people are making the decision to move or change jobs, that they take the commuting 
distance more into account. Even without any road pricing reforms, the majority of the working 
 
can be a major lever to gain community support for road pricing reform, there is also a view and 
evidence that revenue redistribution cannot resolve all equity and fairness concerns. Initial travel 
patterns also matter (Eliasson and Mattsson 2006), especially the concern that individuals undertaking 
most of the trips will the ones most affected by any change, even if the impact is higher levels of time 
benefits. Let us have a closer look at mandatory trips that people cannot avoid, i.e., work, business, 
and education trips. 
                                                          
18 Manville and King (2012) also raise the concern about credible commitment from government in using the revenue in line with 
community supports for reform. The Sydney study by Hensher (see Hensher et al. 2012) found only 22 percent confidence that 
government would allocate revenue the way they would like it allocated. 
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population will likely be moving at least once within the next five years for various reasons19
People who travel a lot by car for business purposes will also have to pay more. Additional costs of 
company car drivers or lease car drivers will likely be compensated by their employers. People who 
have their own business (e.g., plumbers, landscapers) will probably charge their clients, which is 
reasonable since all costs have to be considered when pricing a product or service. Fortunately, this 
increase can be assumed to be small (e.g., $1) compared to the fixed call out charge (e.g., $80) that is 
often asked. Any improvements to the travel times due to the road pricing reform would of course be 
a great benefit to people with their own businesses, as clearly time is money for them (see footnote 2). 
. 
Although less frequent, people also regularly change jobs in their lifetime. Hence, road pricing reform 
should not be a push factor that pushes people away from their current residential and employment 
location, but rather a pull factor (after they have chosen for other reasons to change the residential 
and/or employment location) that pulls people towards more attractive locations from a mobility and 
cost perspective. At the same time, employers should be stimulated to offer alternatives such as 
flexible working hours and working from home; there has been limited effort by employers to provide 
incentives for some occupations where working from home makes eminent sense (as shown by 
Brewer and Hensher 1998, 2000). There may still be a number of people who cannot avoid the long 
commute, e.g., a low income family with limited employment possibilities and a restricted relocation 
budget. Additional compensation would be required to avoid equity loss for these people. 
The number of people who have to travel far by car for education purposes is expected to be fairly 
small. Full time students often use public transport or live close to the school or university. With a 
gradual road pricing reform process, current students will not be affected much, and future students 
can take the extra cost of a long trip to school into account. Again, there may be people that need 
extra support from the government (e.g., parents who have to drop off their child to a special school). 
King et al. (2007) recommend redistribution efforts that concentrate the benefits and create “strong 
advocates” for a proposal, and contend that congestion pricing schemes with concentrated benefits 
and widely-dispersed costs are more likely to succeed. Achieving this outcome is essentially empirical 
and requires knowing what behavioural responses individuals on different incomes would have and 
how this translates into winners and losers on costs and benefits. King et al. (2007) and Peters and 
Kramer (2012) summarise gainers and losers as follows: 
Net beneficiaries associated with improved traffic flow:  
1. Drivers whose time saved is worth more than the fees/charges they pay.  
2. People who already use public transport and will not pay road pricing reform charges but will 
travel faster (i.e., buses in mixed traffic).  
Road pricing reform will create a net loss for:  
3. Drivers whose time saved is worth less than the charges they pay.  
4. Drivers who switch to a less convenient route to avoid the charges.  
5. People on non-priced routes whose traffic increases when drivers from Group 4 switch to 
their roads. 
Hensher and Mulley (2012) offer some evidence in the Sydney (Australia) context of reforms 
proposed above, ranging from use-related registration fee reforms, a cordon-based scheme in the CBD 
and a widespread distance-based charging regime. They find that although individuals on lower 
incomes tend to be more reliant on car use (in part linked to relatively inadequate public transport), 
they do have the opportunity to reduce kilometres since a higher proportion are discretionary and are 
very local, and also the average trip length is much shorter. With an appropriate compensation 
package (including kilometre saving credits), it is possible to make all income groups winners. 
                                                          
19 In Australia (ABS 2010a), in the past five years, 90 per cent of young households (aged 35 or younger) without children have moved at 
least once, 45 per cent of parents in couple families with dependent children have moved at least once, and 59 per cent of lone parents 
with dependent children have moved at least once. In comparison, only 17 per cent of the older households (aged 65 or older) have 
moved at least once within the past five years.  
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Conclusions 
Progress takes time when politicians are involved20
A CBD cordon-based congestion charging scheme is unlikely to deliver significant benefits to a city 
wide transport network. The findings in Hensher et al. (2012) suggest that a wise transition strategy is 
to reform registration charges as suggested above, making the annual registration fee variable as step 
1, followed later by step 2 to make it time dependent. In step 1 people get used to decreases in cost 
relative to their usage, and in step 2 people will actually experience time savings as well.  
, except if there is a champion for the cause, yet 
we cannot avoid them. Short of a bipartisan commitment to road pricing reform (not in spirit, but in 
action), we are left with no recourse but a drip feeding and dragging along of the public (see also 
Ortúzar and Hensher 2012). While the Stockholm congestion charging scheme in the CBD is our best 
success to date in a democratic society, highlighting the essential ingredient of a trial ex ante prior to a 
referendum, it is very much a leap of faith in most societies that this experience can be duplicated, 
especially when the more serious endeavour of system-wide reform is proposed.  
Coming back to our main question, whether it is possible to find a road pricing strategy that satisfies 
the six properties that we defined earlier, we conclude we believe it is possible to  have an strategy 
that (i) is acceptable as it offers discounts on the annual registration fee to the majority of car drivers, 
which is also transparent and easy to communicate and could even be voluntary, plus a gradual reform 
process can prepare people for upcoming changes, (ii) can raise sufficient revenues for infrastructure 
and maintenance,  (iii) is revenue neutral to Treasury, (iv) will alleviate congestion and offer travel 
time benefits using time differentiated charges or rewards, (v) does not require any complicated 
technology besides annual registrations of total travelled kilometres, possibly differentiated in peak 
and off-peak kilometres, and (vi) with appropriate compensation packages can avoid vertical equity 
concerns. 
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